Renewable Energy in Rural Indonesia

by August Schlapfer
© 1999 Photographs by August Schlapfer © 1999 All Rights Reserved

Contents

1. Introduction
2. Factors of Success and Failure in Innovation
3. Case Study 1 (West Java)
4. Case Study 2 (South Sulawesi)
5. Barriers to Innovation in Developing Countries
6. Conclusion
7. References
8. Relevant Links

1. Introduction

On March 22, 1999 I traveled to Indonesia to conduct fieldwork on the islands of Java and Sulawesi for my research on renewable energy in Indonesia. My main aim was to study indigenous systems of innovation in relation to renewable energy in rural areas of Indonesia.

One case study involved a Wind Power Conversion System that was installed in 1993 in the desa of Ciparanti in West Java to supply electricity by the West Australian company Survivor, now Synergy Power Corporation.

For another case study I traveled to Ujung Pandang in southern Sulawesi, where I looked at the Jeneberang River scheme and the water pumping windmills installed along the Jeneberang River by the Indonesian Public Works Department and funded by the Japanese Government.

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2. Factors of Success and Failure in Innovation

On the one hand, innovation involves the recognition of a need, and on the other, it involves technical knowledge, including new scientific and technological information. Professional Research and Development (R&D) is an institutional response to attempt to match the technical possibilities and the market (Freeman, 1982, p109).

One sided innovations, that neglect the specific requirements of potential markets are much less likely to succeed, regardless of the technical accomplishments, than do innovations that have an appreciation and understanding of the potential markets (1982, p110).

National systems of innovation are the result of national government policy. Their policies react to national issues and are more likely to be subjected to changes in political philosophy rather than to changing regional economic needs. Similarly, transnational innovation systems are either responding to the United Nations’, or International Funding Agencies’ demands. They are more likely to respond to pressures ‘to do something’ about a critical global issue than they would to more localized demands. This response can often take the form of an ‘experimental’ or ‘demonstration’ effort without much explicit theoretical basis or deliberate planning (Roessner, 1988, p173). The behaviour of large multinational enterprises is also very similar.

Regional innovation systems on the other hand tend to be more ‘in tune with’ local community demands, because they are largely community driven. Like the transnational and national innovation systems, these localized systems may lack planning, and their innovations more often than not lack the technological sophistication and the financial backing of the national and transnational systems. However, because they tend to have a better understanding of the local community and its specific knowledge, needs and desires, because they are by their very nature a part of the community, they are in a more favorable position to present to the community the technology that is most suited. As Hall points out,

"...assessing the impact of innovation is an enterprise full of pitfalls. First, advances of significant novelty may have limited economic value because potential consumers attach little importance to the improved services provided by the innovation. Second, socio-economic value should not be equated or confused with the level of technical sophistication: technologically simple changes may yield massive returns..., while highly complex innovations may attract no market interest" (1994, p31).

For a system to have a better than average chance to be successful, technological innovators in the developed world have to consider not only the economic impacts associated with innovation, but just as importantly the nature of social, cultural, religious and other functions within society. If these functions are not given due consideration, the process of technological innovation is likely to lead to pathological distortion of society. This can manifest itself in unemployment, pollution, corruption, crime and so on (Roessner, 1988, p96).

New technological systems within the developing nation state need to be developed along similar lines. In addition they face the added difficulty of having to deal with a society that has not been exposed to the ‘modern’, western education system, and is very removed from the culture of technology that is predominant in the industrialized world. Acknowledging that fact is however not sufficient in itself. Before embarking on a specific project of technology transfer, the developers of a technology, like renewable energy, need to research the extent of local knowledge that can be incorporated within the proposed system.

The developers of sustainable energy technology, be that within a regional, national or transnational innovation system, face the difficulty of designing a system or product that remains flexible enough to be able to adapt to a number of different social, cultural, political, economic and environmental situations and peculiarities and take local knowledge into account, and at the same time can be mass-produced, in order to remain competitive.

Specific advantages for renewable energy technology in Indonesia

According to Sastroamidjojo, Indonesia has three main advantages for renewable energy use:

1. Because it is located on the equator there is a confluence of air currents both from the northern and from the southern hemisphere, and an abundance of sunshine throughout the whole year
2. Because it consists of thousands of small and some big islands there is wind energy available during the day (from the sea) and during the night (from inland to the coast).
3. Because there are still active volcanoes, there is an abundance of geothermal energy (1996, p2).

In addition, Indonesia has an abundance of biomass, like rice husks, animal and human waste etc. which can all be used to produce renewable energy.

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3. Case Study 1: West Java

Dr. Sastroamidjojo and myself traveled to Ciparanti in West Java to find out what exactly happened to the Wind Generator that was installed in May 1993 in the kampung (part of village) of Chitoto (Picture 1.1) in the desa (village) of Chiparanti, in the district of Cimerak, which forms a part of the Ciamis Regency of West Java.

Picture 1.1: House of the kepala kampung of Chitoto

According to a viability report produced by the West Australian company Survivor, a Wind Power Conversion System was installed in 1993 in the desa of Ciparanti in West Java to supply electricity.

Background of the Project

On December 14, 1992 a Memorandum of Understanding on a Renewable Energy Pilot Project was drawn up between the Ministry of Cooperatives of the Republic of Indonesia (MOC) and the then Department of State Development (currently Department of Commerce and Trade) of Western Australia. They decided to cooperate in the development of renewable energy in Indonesia and drew up the following memorandum:

A. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia (called "GOI") has stipulated in its guidelines of State Policy that an objective of power sector development is to improve the welfare of the population, especially in rural areas, and to support and stimulate economic activities. In addition to Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara, GOI also sponsors rural electrification by MOC through its Directorate General of Cooperative Business Promotion.

B. The Directorate General for Cooperative Business Promotion, Ministry of Cooperatives (called "DGCBP") is the nominated Agency for GOI responsible for rural electrification.

C. ;The Department of State Development has a strong interest in supporting the progress of renewable energy development and the installation of stand alone remote area power systems in the remote areas of Western Australia. It has traditionally been an active supporter of the development of renewable energy industry in Western Australia and has targeted this area as one of strategic significance.

D. Both parties have agreed to work together in the interests of developing renewable energy in Indonesia. Specifically, the Department is interested in promoting the use of Western Australian technology to develop a wind turbine generating system for Indonesia’s rural electrification program (Survivor, 1993, pp.-23).

The objectives of the two parties involved in drawing up and signing the memorandum were:

1. To find alternative sources of renewable energy for rural areas (to be produced) bycooperatives, focusing on electricity production and the economic capacity of people in rural areas;
2. As a pilot project by the relevant R&D offices - Department of Technology, LAPAN, Directorate-General of Lembaga Energi Terbarukan (Renewable Energy Institute) - for promoting research and the spread of new technologies for rural electrification.
3. To demonstrate the development of small-scale wind power technology for a range of purposes such as lighting, charging batteries, water pumps and local handicrafts by providing electricity to meet the requirement of villages and areas not/not yet supplied by the State Electricity Board (PLN) (Survivor, 1993, p. 1).

The system proposed by Survivor was a hybrid wind/diesel system. The wind turbine was specifically designed to produce electricity at low wind speeds of around 4.5m/sec or 16km/hour, which are commonly experienced in Indonesia. The diameter of the propeller blades of the Survivor wind turbine was five times that of conventional wind turbines. If wind speed increased the blades would automatically flatten out, thus reducing the area exposed to the wind. It was designed to produce relatively great electrical power when wind speed was low, and continued to produce electricity no matter what wind speed, without requiring a brake system (Survivor, 1993, p.3).

Because of the diesel back-up generator the Survivor hybrid turbine was able to provide electricity continuously, and was not depending on high winds. During the first five months of its operation the wind turbine produced 60.2 per cent of the average daily electricity demand of the kampung of Chitoto in the desa of Ciparanti (Survivor, 1993, p.6).

At the time Survivor was confident that its hybrid wind/diesel system was appropriate to be developed in most regions within Indonesia. According to the November 1993 Survivor viability report, because the method of construction was very simple, requiring no heavy machinery during installation, it was very suitable for the development of electrical power plants in remote areas (Survivor, 1993, p.7).

Picture 1.2: Construction of Survivor's wind generator

Construction of the hybrid wind/diesel system (picture 1.2) lasted 8 weeks and was completed in May 1993. The project was designed to supply 50 adjoining houses in the kampung of Chitoto with 220 volt AC power each on a 24 hour basis to a maximum daily output of 250 watts per day, with a house unit peak demand of 40 watts. Each house was wired for two high efficiency lights and one power point. Survivor also provided the kampung community with a 54cm color TV (Survivor, 1993, p.26).

Survivor contributed the following to the project:

1xS-20000 SURVIVOR Wind Turbine

1x4KW DC Diesel Generating Set

1xWind Turbine Load Controller

1xAutomatic Electronic Diesel Controller

1x4KW Sinewave DC to AC Inverter

1xSwitchboard and Load Centre

1xMonitoring Data Logger with Anemometer

1xSet of Spare Parts, Manuals and Documentation

1xPackaging, freight to Jakarta, supervision and on-site commissioning and on-going site support and monitoring

1xBattery Bank comprising type XTHF25D 24 cells of 2V rating

1xBattery Storage Rack, Trays and Accessories

1x26m Turbine Tilt Tower, Guy Wires and Fittings

1xSet of Cables, Wiring and Fittings

1xSecurity Housing and Enclosure for Batteries and Controls

1xWharf Clearance, Cartage to Site and Erection

1xInstallation of the Survivor Package

1xReticulation on Electricity to 50 adjoining houses

1x54cm Colour TV

(Survivor, 1993, p.31)

The Western Australian Department of State Development contributed nothing and its Indonesian counterpart contributed the following:

1. Provision of an unobstructed land within the vicinity of Ciparanti with approximate area of 20x20m.
   
2. Access road to above site.
3. Monitoring activities to assess the performance of the SURVIVOR Systems, provide written reports and site data analysis.
4. Training for villagers to operate the SURVIVOR Systems.
5. Maintenance of the SURVIVOR Systems.
6. Provision of interpreter to Survivor.
7. Provision of relevant permits, such as construction permit (IMB), visas or Supervisor’s personnel and others. (No mean feat!!) (Survivor, 1993, p.31).

The monitoring and evaluation of the project was conducted by the Indonesian National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN) and the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) (Survivor, 1993, p.1).

In the conclusion of its November 1993 viability report, Survivor claims that since the beginning of operation in May 1993, the system suffered no significant problems, and was able to produce electricity continuously. Survivor was optimistic that:

"using this system as a model, the SURVIVOR could be developed for applications on a larger scale including:

Electricity demand for lighting in villages of between 300 and 500 households.

Electricity demand for small-scale industry associated with local economic activities, such as:

• drying of seafood
• fishfarming
• handicrafts
• reprocessing of agricultural produce, etc.

When combined with water pumps, this system can be used to supply fresh water.

Electricity needed for radio and television transmission/receiver systems in isolated areas"

(Survivor, 1993, p.1).

Survivor was expressing its confidence that it would be able to illustrate to the Indonesian Government that the SURVIVOR System was capable of providing an economically viable, environmentally sustainable, reliable and cost effective electricity supply, appropriate to the needs of rural communities in Indonesia. It was further hoping to develop a "Learning by Doing" centre whereby other rural communities could gain first hand experiences from the Pilot Project. Survivor felt confident that as a result of the successful completion of the Pilot Project it could form a joint Indonesian/Australian venture with P.T. ANDHYKA SENTRABERSAMA of Jakarta, Indonesia on a commercial basis for cooperative business, and involve international funding organizations like The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and AusAID in further projects. Lastly, Survivor envisaged that this would lead to the ongoing transfer of relevant technologies from Australia to Indonesia (Survivor, 1993, p.25).

Findings

On our arrival in the kampung of Chitoto in the desa of Ciparanti on April 1, 1999, it became clear that the Survivor hybrid wind/diesel system had been dismantled some time ago (Picture 1.3) and instead the whole village had been connected to the PLN grid. We were naturally not unaware of this fact, however, we were here to find out what happened, why it happened, when it happened, for what reasons it happened, and how the people directly involved in and affected by this process viewed the situation.

Picture 1.3: Foundations of dismantled wind generator

According to some of the women from Chitoto we spoke to firstly Picture 1.4), the wind/diesel system was dismantled and taken away in 1994. The people were happy when the wind/diesel system was installed. When it was removed in 1994, they did not want it to be removed, despite the fact that it was no longer operational since the end of 1993, but were given no choice in the matter. Because the wind generating system was backed up by a diesel generator, it was not necessary for it to work, as long as the diesel had enough fuel.

Picture1.4: Women from Chitoto kampung discussing the wind generator

This was confirmed later by the kepala (head) kampung of Chitoto, a village official from Ciparanti, as well as the kepala desa (village head) of Ciparanti. According to them, the wind/diesel system was supplying 50 houses with 50 watt each, enough for 5x10watt light bulbs per house. In addition, it supplied enough energy to power the TV donated to the community by Survivor. The power generated from the system was further used for lighting the mosque and the community room; it was however not used for the school library or the school itself.

When the wind generator broke down the first time in 1993, "because the west wind was too strong" (Ciparanti village official 1999), it was repaired by P.T. ANDHYKA SENTRABERSAMA of Jakarta. The local people had no involvement in the maintenance of the wind generator. They were however involved in the maintenance of the diesel generator.

During the time of operation of the wind/diesel system, electricity was used on a 24 hour basis, regardless of wind conditions. The batteries were not kept filled, this meant the diesel generator was needed regularly. The people were not aware of energy conservation, most villagers appeared to have no understanding of electricity.

During operation the charges per household for the electricity generated was Rp 5000, which was not enough to cover the fuel costs incurred by the diesel generator. The difference was subsidized by the government.

By approximately mid 1994, the whole desa of Ciparanti was connected to the electricity grid (Picture 1.5). The cost for electricity per household per months by PLN is Rp 10 000, which is twice as much as the subsidized cost of the wind/ diesel system was.

Prior to that the villagers were without electricity for 6 months. The villagers are now happy to be connected to the grid, although they did find the wind/diesel system quite satisfactory, when it worked. However, when it was dismantled and removed in 1994, including the TV set, they felt that they had been used as guinea pigs by the Indonesian Government.

There is a general consensus among the three village officials that there is a need for an education program for the people to learn about electricity.

Picture 1.5: Power house in Chitoto

The most obvious question to ask is why did the project go ahead in the first place, virtually one year before the area was connected to the grid?

Second, according to the kampung people there was no involvement by the people, no education program, and certainly no consultation with the community. Why?

Was it simply a case of not seeing the need for the village people to be educated?

Why was the electricity generated not used for schooling (e.g. library lights, lights in classrooms? According to the people, the only community use was for the mosque and the community meeting place.

What happened to the hybrid wind/diesel system supplied by Survivors after it was dismantled? The villagers told us that it went to Jepara.

How do the many levels of bureaucracy or administration in Indonesia impact on a project like this?

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4. Case Study 2: South Sulawesi

On April 15, 1999 I arrived in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi, to find out more about the different water pumping windmills that had been installed along the banks of the Jeneberang River (Picture 2.1), as part of the Proyek Pengembangan dan Konservasi Sumber Air Jeneberang (The Jeneberang Water Conservation Project) since the late 1980s. The project is led by the Department Pekerjaan Umum Direktorat Jenderal Pengairan (Public Works Department Directorat General Pengairan), and funded by the Japanese Government.

Picture 2.1: Jeneberang River

Most of the windmill systems are vertical axis wind generators and were designed and constructed locally by engineers at the Indonesian Government institution Balai Penelitian Tanaman Jagung dan Seralia lain (BALITJAS) (Research Institute for Maize and other Cereals) in Maros, South Sulawesi. Two wind generators were designed and constructed by M.A.S. Sastroamidjojo (also vertical axis), and one horizontal axis windmill was donated by an NGO from the United States.

Picture 2.2: American designed windmill

The Maros Research Institute for Foodcrops (MORIF) in South Sulawesi was formed by the Indonesian Government in 1973 with the mandate to increase food production on dry land and dry climate areas of Indonesia. One of its aims was to teach farmers how to use groundwater for secondary crops.

In 1989 a pilot project was started in Nusa Tengara Timur to utilize groundwater and help farmers with holdings smaller than 2000m² to grow Soya beans, Mong beans and Pigeon peas to improve their nutrition. The name of the project was Nusa Tengara Agricultural Support Project (NTASP). It was funded by the World Bank and administered by the Indonesian Government (Picture 2.3). Part of this project was to install one windmill at a place called Naibonat in West Timor and one at Maumere on the island of Flores to pump water.

Picture 2.3: Engineers from BALITJAS, MORIF and the Jeneberang River Project

These two vertical axis windmills were the first ones designed and constructed by engineers at BALITJAS in 1987 (Picture 2.4). According to Abi Prabowo, a soil and water irrigation engineer with BALITJAS, who visited Naibonat in West Timor and Maumere in Flores in February 1998, both water-pumping windmills for land irrigation and domestic water supply were still functioning at that time (Prabowo, 1999, pers. com.).

The windmills and pumps were a gift by the World Bank and the Indonesian Government to the people of Naibonat and Maumere. However, the maintenance of the systems has to be done and paid for by the people themselves, without any assistance by the Indonesian Government. It appears that the people of both communities have managed to keep the windmills operational by themselves for almost ten years (Prabowo, 1999, pers. com.).

In 1995, the chief engineer at BALITJAS had redesigned the windmill system, and since than almost 20 of the improved design have been installed along the Jeneberang River, to add to the 40 installed prior to 1995 (Picture 2.5).

Picture 2.4: Model of vertical axis windmill designed by BALTJAS

Picture 2.5: Vertical axis windmill designed by BALTJAS on the banks of Jeneberang River

At the time of my visit to South Sulawesi in April 1999, less than 10 out of the 60 installed windmills along the Jeneberang River were still operational. The main reasons according to R. Hasan, an engineer with the public works department in Ujung Pandang were:

During the recent storms a number of windmills were almost totally destroyed.

Because the fields to be irrigated adjacent to the Jeneberang River are generally not large enough to support a family, as a result the farmers are forced to take on extra work to make ends meet. This means, they do not have the time to maintain the systems. It further means, they do not have the money to pay for the maintenance and they lack the expertise to maintain the systems.

Since the monetary crisis has hit Indonesia in 1997, the public works department of South Sulawesi has been short of funds and had to abandon its monitoring program (1999, pers. com.).

The only electricity generating vertical axis wind generator installed by Dr. Sastroamidjojo from Yogyakarta was also out of order (Picture 2.6), and according to R. Hasan, was never working properly, "because the windmill did not generate enough power to produce electricity" (1999, pers. com.). Furthermore, like many of the other vertical axis windmills, the structure was not strong enough to withstand the strong winds associated with the recent storms. (The vertical axis wind system installed on this site was an early model. Dr. Sastroamidjojo has since introduced the more efficient and structurally more sound "Seno-Vertical-Axis, Helical Wind-System").I also noticed that the chain and sprocket gear system was badly corroded, and looked like it had never been greased.

Picture 2.6: Vertical axis electricity generating windmill with power house, designed by Dr. Satroamidjojo

Generally, the farmers were happy with the wind generated water pumps, as long as they were working. It satisfied their domestic water needs as well as irrigating their crops. They were however not able to maintain or repair the systems.

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5. Barriers to Innovation in Developing Countries

Example of Indonesian bureaucracy

On arrival in Jakarta I immediately reported to the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI) about my research visa. I had allowed two days to sort out my visa and the various permits attached to it. Instead of the two days, it required four days of my time to obtain the different permits and letters from the Police Department and the Social Politics Department and the Governor’s Office in Jakarta. Finally, and almost miraculously it was all over, I had all my permits.

The next day I traveled to Bandung and arrived the following day in Yogyakarta, where I stayed with my Indonesian adviser, Dr. Sastroamidjojo, where I began my research in earnest.

Not wanting to spend anymore time with Indonesian bureaucracy I went straight to work organizing a field trip to Ciparanti in West Java. By the time I reported to Gadjah Mada University it was April 6. There I was immediately informed that I was supposed to have reported to the immigration office by March 28.

I neglected to check the Indonesian visa page of my passport and I failed to check whether one of the letters from LIPI was addressed to the Yogyakarta Immigration Office. In my passport it stated that I was to report to the Yogyakarta Immigration Office within six days. I arrived at Jakarta airport on March 22, and I did not report to the Yogyakarta Immigration Office until April 6. In other words, I was late.

It was about 9.30am when we arrived at the Immigration Office. We did not leave the place before 1.10pm, having filled out numerous forms in duplicate, having to go back several times, having to get photocopies done (across a busy street, so we sent one of the people, who seem to be there just for that purpose), having been fingerprinted, minus my passport and minus Rp 550 000 (approx. A$100). I was lucky to get my passport back by April 12 with my permit to conduct research in Yogyakarta.

In addition, the governor’s office in Yogyakarta requested that I present them with a written proposal for my intended research in Yogyakarta. When I informed them that my research proposal had been accepted by LIPI, I was told that this did not cover research in Yogyakarta. Yogyakarta being a sultanate means that if something is accepted by the Indonesian Government still will need to be separately applied for in Yogyakarta. In other words, in Yogyakarta’s case an additional layer of bureaucracy will have to be dealt with.

Considering the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures it is not surprising that the implementation of renewable energy systems in the rural areas of Indonesia has so many negative outcomes. For example, a community living in a village somewhere in rural Indonesia is in need of electricity. A company or an aid organization would like to implement a renewable energy system in this village. They not only would have to carefully consider all the technical, environmental, social, cultural and economic factors, just as importantly, they would have to take into consideration the political structure of Indonesia: in other words deal with all the different layers of bureaucracy.

I have outlined the administrative structure of Indonesia below:

1. Rukun Tetanga (RT) or Neighborhood
2. Rukun Warga (RW) or Community, known as ‘kampung’ in rural areas
3. Kelurahan (Precinct), known as ‘desa’ in rural areas
4. Kecamatan (Borough)
5. Local Government
6. Provincial Government
7. National Government

(Suriptono, 1999, ISTP, Murdoch University, Ph.D. thesis in progress).

In between the government administrative layers there are the following four groups of non-government players to consider:

1. Indonesian non-government organizations and foundations
2. National private enterprises
3. International non-government organizations and foundations
4. International private enterprises.

Overlaying all other levels are:

1. Large multinational enterprises
2. Overseas governments
3. International funding agencies.

Each government administration is headed by a director. Within the bureaucracy of the National, Provincial and Local Government, all department heads are from the military. From Kecamatan down to RT, the leaders are made up of a mix of civilian and army personnel. However, quite a number of the non-military heads of departments are retired military men. In other words, the military presence in the bureaucratic apparatus in Indonesia is prominent (Robison, 1977, pp231-233).

The legacy of the Suharto Regime is a cumbersome, and often self-serving bureaucracy controlled by the military. The main motivation by the regime was not to make the bureaucracy efficient, but rather to use it to build up and protect the power base of the Suharto Regime (Shin, 1989, p162). Consequently, Indonesia’s bureaucracy still presents a massive barrier to prospective innovative renewable energy technology.

The big question is, how is it possible to involve the community in a meaningful way in the decision making process under those circumstances, other than changing the whole structure of the existing political system?

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6. Conclusion

The Survivor windgenerator system in Ciparanti, West Java is an example of how the internationally funded and nationally directed energy program resulted in an unsatisfactory outcome for the community and the supplier of the technology. An apparent lack of planning/communication by the decision makers in the national government led to the construction of renewable energy technology in a community only twelve months before the village was connected to the grid. Furthermore, the exclusion of involvement at the community level in the innovation and implementation process, as well as a lack of community education programs led to a lack of appreciation of the advantages of the wind generator by the community members and they remained largely dependable on government subsidized fossil fuel technology.

The people of Ciparanti felt that they had been used as guinea pigs by the Indonesian Government, because at no stage where they ever consulted, they had no input in the decision making process. When "The Government" decided to remove the windgenerator, and more importantly, the diesel generator and the TV set, they were powerless to intervene. And now that they have become recipients of grid connected electricity, they have joined the ranks of energy consumers, without having been consulted about there wishes and needs.

Perhaps it can be argued that because the community of Ciparanti at large is now happy to rely on grid connected, fossil fuel based energy, there is no problem. Nevertheless, the question remains, whether in the long run they would not have been better served by establishing an electricity supply system based on renewable energy technology, rather than becoming dependent on an energy system that is not sustainable because it uses diminishing fossil resources. The people of Ciparanti were never in a position to make an informed choice.

One of the main problems facing regional innovation systems in Indonesia as well as other developing countries is a lack of funding. National and transnational innovation systems usually rely on a financial infrastructure designed and provided by international funding agencies and large corporations. However, as the case of Indonesian’s monetary crisis illustrates, national innovation systems are ultimately tied up with the economic situation of the country.

As a consequence of the economic crisis in Indonesia, funding for the Maros Research Institute for Foodcrops (MORIF) in South Sulawesi was severely reduced. The case demonstrates that indigenous renewable energy technology, or any other indigenous innovators are forced to work within the constraints of the economic and political situation of the country they are part of, whereas internationally funded innovators are able to withdraw at any time. Thus in terms of sustainability, transnationally funded systems of innovation are more likely to withdraw, for the simple reason that they can, and because international funding agencies will always go where the profitability of a scheme is assured.

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7. References

Freeman, C. (1982) The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Second Edition, London, Frances Printer.

Hall, P. (1994) Innovation, Economics and Evolution - Theoretical Perspectives on Changing Technology in Economic Systems, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Robison, R. (1977) Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia 1965-1975, Ph.D. thesis, Department of Government, Sydney University, Australia.

Roessner, J.D. (ed.) (1988) Government Innovation Policy, Hampshire, England, McMillan Press.

Sastroamidjojo, M.S.A. (1996) "The Seno-Vertical-Axis, Helical Wind-System" Proceedings of Simposium Bidang Sains, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani, Bandung, Indonesia.

Shin, Y.H. (1989) Demystifying the Capitalist State: Political Patronage, Bureaucratic Interests, and Capitalits-in-Formation in Soeharto’s Indonesia, Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, USA.

Suriptono (1999) Domestic Waste Water Treatment Policy in Indonesian Cities, Ph.D. thesis in progress, ISTP, Murdoch University, Australia.

Survivor (1993) Viability Report (compiled by Survivor Energy Systems on the Survivor S-2000 Wind Turbine/Diesel Hybrid System in Ciparanti, West Java).

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8. Relevant Links

ACRE: http://wwwphys.murdoch.edu.au/acre/

GTZ: http://www.gtz.de/home/english/index.htm

NREL International Programs: http://www.rsvp.nrel.gov/

Windpower: http://www.windpower.dk/core.htm

WIRE Homepage Module: http://wire0.ises.org/

World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/cas/index.htm

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